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Abstract
We analyze how different policy interventions may incentive emersion from unde-
clared work. We use Italian data over the period 1998-2003 to investigate whether the
2003 Italian labor market reform was able to reach the objective to reduce the share
of shadow economy. We develop a search and matching model, a´ la Mortensen, on the
basis of our empirical investigation to determine the right mix of policy interventions
which maybe effective in generating an emersion effect. Our preliminary findings show
that differentiated forms of taxations and enforcement might create a good combination
of incentives to achieve a significant reduction in undeclared work.
1 Introduction
Despite tax evasion being a topic extensively studied in economic literature, it is still debated
which instruments might be effective to achieve deterrence. Increasing the probability of
being caught by a tax enforcement agency or augmenting the fines for this non compliant
behaviors are commonly considered the two most important interventions against evasion.
In both cases, however, there is contrasting evidence on the effect of these instruments on
tax compliance (Garrido and Mittone [19], Alm et al.[3], Diporto [13]). The problem is even
more complicated when we move from simple deterrence to emersion.
Emersion from tax evasion is defined, in the case of labor tax evasion, in Di Porto e Elia
[14], as the transition of a working employee from the undeclared to the declared sector.
More generally, we can define emersion in relation to the evasion of any tax, such as V.A.T.,
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income tax, property tax, as the report of an undeclared quantity (i.e. dollars, rents, hours
worked) to the tax authorities. As noticed by Di Porto e Elia [14], emersion can be pure
when the exact undeclared quantity is reported, or partial, when in the process of emersion
a part of the undeclared quantity gets “lost”. In this case we observe a contraction in the
total undeclared quantity but we do not observe a corresponding quantity declared to the
tax authorities.
It is worth notice that deterrence and emersion are related concepts but they are not
synonyms. To better understand the difference between the two, think about a context in
which the tax authority can commit to its audit strategy and can inspect with probability
1 all the non compliant tax payers. In this case, the optimal equilibrium audit scheme
includes full deterrence; therefore, everybody is compliant and there is no emersion. Hence,
we can conclude that emersion starts when deterrence fails. As noted by Boeri e Garibaldi
[5] and Schneider [25], in recent years undeclared work has flourished. This might suggest
the presence of some degrees of tolerance towards evasion, or it might emphasize the fact
that deterrence is a difficult task to implement.
The objective of this paper is to demonstrate that a right mix of interventions could
generate some kind of emersion, in the context of labor tax evasion. In several countries,
(e.g., Italy, France, Germany), employers are responsible for paying a fraction of the social
security contributions for their workers1. Evading these payments is the same as declaring
only some of the hours worked. Undeclared work plays a major role in several developing and
developed countries. In a recent study, Jutting et al.[20] show that out of a global working
population of 3 billion workers, nearly two-thirds (1.8 billion) are undeclared or informal.
Schneider [25] estimates that in the European area the number of persons working in the
unofficial economy doubled from 1978 to 1998. According to a report of the Pew Hispanic
Center, the number of illegal immigrants living in the United States was 11.9 million in 2008,
of which 8.3 million were part of the U.S. labor force (Cohn and Passel [9]). According to
the Canadian Encyclopedia, the police and immigration personnel estimated the number of
illegal immigrants in Canada to range between 50,000 and 200,000. Similar percentages are
reported for BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India and China) and Eastern European countries.
Which are the instruments that can be used to incentive the emersion of at least part
of these workers? This paper tries to provide an answer by studying the 2003 Italian labor
market reform, which introduced new types of short term contracts, as an instrument for
emersion.
Short-term employment contracts have been deployed rapidly across the rigid EU economies
since the early 1990s. Featuring short (fixed) duration, lower costs, and more straightfor-
ward hiring procedures, they are designed to be an agile instrument to increase labor market
flexibility and, in turn, to reduce unemployment. In Italy, there are two additional reasons
which motivated the implementation of these reforms. First, short-term contracts might
have helped increase labor force participation, which is particularly low among women. Sec-
ond, they might have contributed significantly to reduce the share of undeclared work, and
therefore labor tax evasion, which is estimated to account for 17% of the Italian GDP. In
1In Italy this fraction amounts to two third of the total contribution.
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order to target the last objective, the Italian Government approved a number of reforms,
which introduced several types of short-term contracts to target specific situations, in which
undeclared work might have prevailed. As of today, in Italy the workers unions count up
to 46 different types of employment contracts. Moreover, the Italian share of short-term
employment jumped from 5% in 1990 to approximately 13% in 2010. The objective of this
paper is, firstly, to test empirically whether these reforms have been successful in reducing
the share of undeclared work (through the emersion channel). By estimating several econo-
metric specifications based on microeconomic Italian data, we investigate whether and how
the undeclared work has changed after the reform has been implemented. This is to test the
validity of short term contracts as an instrument to create emersion. Then, we use these
empirical findings as the basis to develop a search and matching model. This is intended
to explain workers and firms behaviors when different types of contracts are available and
when firms may decide whether to hire workers legally or illegally. Latu sensu, the avail-
ability of several types of contracts plays the same role as increasing the opportunity to pay
taxes, introducing new form of taxations for similar kind of services. Therefore, a distortion
in the tax payer’s behavior after the policy intervention is expected. We design a search
model in the spirit of Diamond [10] and Mortensen and Pissarides [22] and calibrate it to
evaluate potential interventions to generate emersion. In the model we account for workers’
heterogeneity, social security contributions, and differentiated contracts. In addition, we
distinguish between formal and informal jobs and we endogenize the decision of the firms to
hire in the formal or informal sector when they open a vacancy. The motivation relies on
our objective to explain the differences in job creation rates in the declared and undeclared
sector. We assume that firms post generic vacancies and when they are ready to hire the
worker, they decide whether to hire it legally or illegally. In addition, they decide whether
to hire it on a short-term basis or permanently. If a worker is hired legally, the firm has to
pay social security contributions to the tax authority. If the worker is hired illegally, the
firm does not pay social security contributions, but might be caught by the tax enforcement
authority and be subject to the payment of a penalty fee. The type of contract and the sector
(declared or undeclared) are chosen by the firm according to several parameters, such as the
quality of the match, the social security fees, the probability to be caught, if acting illegally.
In the model, we also allow for transitions from the declared to the undeclared sector and
viceversa. The calibration of the model allows us to draw conclusions regarding the rationale
behind the firms’ decisions and to evaluate the effects of several policy interventions.
Our findings provide evidence in favor of multiple combined interventions to create emer-
sion: the optimal policy includes a mix of deterrent policies and differentiated opportunities
to pay taxes (i.e., introducing new contracts in the labor market). From the empirical anal-
ysis, we conclude that the 2003 reforms ”alone” was not effective in reducing the share of
undeclared work. Therefore, short-term contracts per se are not an efficient instrument to
reduce undeclared work. When we calibrate the model according to the Italian regulations
and institutions, we test the effects of several policy interventions, such as the increase of
the monitor rate of the informal sector, the increase of the penalty fee, the reduction of the
social security fees. We conclude that emersion is possible just with a well designed mix of
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policies that work at different levels.
1.1 Literature review
There are several strands of literature related to this paper.
First of all, this study is linked to the extensive empirical literature on short-term em-
ployment contracts and their impact on European labor markets. Studies such as Berton [4],
Tealdi [28] and Guell [16] investigate the way short-term contracts have changed the pattern
dynamics across states and contracts. Specifically, their objective is to identify the role of
short-term contracts as screening device or as an instrument for firms to reduce costs. Their
results show that both in Italy and in Spain short-term contracts are used for both purposes.
In addition, Pfeifer [23] shows that in Germany short-term contracts are utilized by firms
to adjust the workforce according to business cycle fluctuations. A parallel strand of the
literature studies the effects of short-term contracts on labor market aggregates, such as em-
ployment and unemployment rates. In this context, findings are not always aligned. Berton
[4] investigates whether short-term contracts have been effective in reducing the high rate
of long-term unemployment in Italy. His results provide a negative answer. Regarding the
effect of short-term contracts on employment, Giannelli [15] shows that in Italy short-term
contracts did not help increase the length of the first employment spell. In addition, she
shows that in general in Italy short-term contracts are associated with higher uncertainty.
For the case of Spain, Aguirregabiria and Alonso-Borrego [1] finds that short-term contracts
had a positive effect on employment and job turnover. Guell and Petrongolo [16] shows
that the rate at which workers leave unemployment is higher after the reforms.This paper
complements the existing literature, by testing for the first time whether the introduction of
short-term contracts has been effective in reducing the share of undeclared work in Italy.
Second, this paper is related to the literature on black economy, tax evasion and unde-
clared work. Tax evasion is a problem widely reported since the antiquities. However, it
is very difficult to be investigated both from the theoretical and the empirical perspective.
Overall, theoretical models based on taxpayer rationality have shown to be unable to de-
scribe properly the behavior of agents involved in tax evasion. On the other hand, both game
theory and any rational choice approach to the problem of tax compliance, level of penalties
and enforcement appears to be insufficient in explaining the degree of concurrence with the
tax law. As a consequence, in the last 15 years economists have started investigating the
behavioral and experimental aspects of tax evasion, by analyzing the variety of psychological
reasons influencing the choice to pay taxes, such as honesty, fear, sense of group membership
(Chorvat and Knoll. [8], Alm et al. [3]). On the empirical side, the lack of reliable data
on tax evasion has raised concerns on the robustness of the findings. Typically, data on tax
evasion are part of administrative audit databases, which often carry a selection problem
and not always provide sufficient information to cope with this issue. Some progress in this
direction has been achieved during the past few years by using ad hoc surveys (Piketty et al.
[24] , Di Nardo et al. [11]) and by relying on individual audit data, where the information
provided is detailed enough to allow the adoption of a proper selection model (Di Porto [12]
and Di Porto et al. [13]).
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Finally, this paper relates to the search model of dynamic labor demand of Mortensen
and Pissarides [22]. We extend their framework, by allowing firms to hire workers in different
sectors (formal or informal). Moreover, as in Tealdi [28], firms are allowed to offer different
types of contracts (permanent or short-term) to the workers and are bound to pay social
security fees whenever they hire a worker in the formal sector. Within this literature, this
model specifically relates to studies which use the search theory to address the issue of
undeclared work (Bouev [7], Kolm and Larsen [21], Fugazza and Jacques [18], Albreacht et
al. [2] , Boeri and Garibaldi [5]). The paper which most closely resembles our work is the one
by Bosch and Esteban-Pretel [6], in which direct transitions from the formal to the informal
sector (and vice versa) are allowed. While they use this set up to analyze the undeclared
work phenomenon in developing countries, it serves our purpose to test the effects of the
reforms implemented in Italy to increase labor market flexibility.
2 Facts and stats
TBD
3 Empirical Models and Results
This section shows the empirical models performed to test our main hypotheses , namely that
law no 30/2003 (“Biagi Law”) does not affect the supply of undeclared workers. The ”Biagi
law” represented the last and more extensive reform applied to the Italian labor market.
The reform improved earlier short-term contracts and introduced new contractual forms to
better meet the requirements of a changing labour market. One of the major innovation
introduced by the reform pertained to the apprenticeship contract. This type of short-term
contract has existed for a long time and has also been reformed several times. The lower labor
costs associated with it (mostly social security contributions) make it particularly convenient
to employers and are intended to compensate firms for the training costs that they incur.
Firms are required to give to apprentices time off work to attend training courses provided
by local authorities or accredited training institute. Since there are limitations to this formal
activity due to lack of public funding and of infrastructures for training courses, most of the
training occurs on-the-job. The ”Biagi law” liberalized further these contracts. The main
change was related to the training, that is, it introduced the option of performing training
at the workplace as a substitute for external training. This point made it more difficult
to monitor compliance with this obligation by firms. The new rules were not implemented
at once, but regional governments, which have exclusive power to legislate over vocational
training, had to issue regional regulations. The process was slow such that at the end
of 2011 only 15 out of 20 regions are adopted the new regulations. No regions passed
any guidelines in 2003 and 2004. Emilia Romagna and Toscana enacted the regulations
in 2005, while Friuli, Marche , Sardegna and the autonomous province of Bolzano did it
in 2006, and Lazio in 2007. Moreover, It was permitted by national government with the
5
law no 80/2005 that collective agreements could specify the training content of the new
apprenticeship, in absence of regional legislations. Collective agreements took place in the
following sectors: Textile, Wood products, Chemicals, Construction, Transportation, Retail
Trade Food Products, Telecommunication, Energy, Banking, Metal Manufacturing. We
exploit this variation over time and regions (sectors) in a difference-in-differences framework.
We start with analyzing the effect of shifts in temporary jobs regulations on the distribu-
tion of hours worked by undeclared and declared workers. We accomplish this by estimating
the following equation:
log(U/D)r,t = c+ γ(DReform)r,t + βXr,t + δr + ζt + r,t (1)
where log(U/D)r,t is the ratio of undeclared to declared hours in the region r at time
t, DReform is a dummy variable which takes on the value of one for the years and regions
affected by the policy, δr are regional fixed effects, ζt are time fixed effects and r,t is an
error term. Xr,t is a matrix of regional covariates which may help predicting the dependent
variable. Table 3 shows the estimates of different version of the equation (1). We use data
from 1996 to 2008 provided by SHIW survey of Bank of Italy. Note that since we estimate
equation 1 using a region panel data, the policy dummy DReform considers only part of
the variation of the reform, namely that one corresponding to the regions, neglecting the
source of variation coming from the industry sectors. The baseline model which controls
only for regional and time fixed effects is shown in column 1. Model 2 adds some regional
confounding factors, such as the regional share of Construction, Retail Trade, Transport and
Real Estate, the average age of the working population, the average education and work
experience and the share of women. Model 3 also controls for the unemployment rate and
the share of temporary jobs, while columns 4 and 5 uses a shorter time period, 2000-2008
and 2002-2008 respectively. As it is clear from Table 3 the coefficient on the dummy policy
variable is not statistically different from zero in all cases. This results are consistent with
our hypothesis of no impact of the reform on the ratio of undeclared and declared workers.
The effect of the other covariates are mostly not significantly different from zero; this is not
surprising because lots of the variance of the dependent variable is captured by the regional
and time fixed effects.
In the previous equation the identification of the reform dummy relied on the time and re-
gional difference in the implementation of the new regulations, neglecting the part originating
from the industry sector-time differences. We exploit all the variation in the reform dummy
by using individual data from SHIW. Pooling the waves from 1998 to 2008, we estimate the
following equation for the probability of working in the undeclared labor market:
P (Undeclared = 1|X)i,r,t = c+ γ(DReform)r,t + βXi,r,t + δr + ζt + i,r,t (2)
where DReform is our dummy variable identifying the change in policy, δr are regional
fixed effects, ζt are time fixed effects and Xi,r,t is a matrix of individual characteristics. We
run this equation by using ordinary least squares, so the estimated coefficients are readily
interpretable as marginal effects. Table 4 shows the estimated coefficients of different speci-
fications of equation (2). Column 1 is the baseline model, which controls for time and region
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fixed effects. Columns 2-7 add a set of individual characteristics, such as work experience
and its square, square in age, dummies for educational levels, the interactions between ex-
perience and education levels, a dummy for part time job, a dummy for fixed-term contract,
a dummy for migrant, and a dummy selecting workers living in urban areas. In addition,
we also include industry sectors dummies and occupation dummies. The model in column 3
takes into account region-specific time trend, which may correlate with our policy variable.
Since legislations on temporary jobs should potentially affect more heavily those groups of
people which experience poor labor market outcomes, we estimate equation 2 focusing on
young persons under 24-30 years old and women. The results for this exercise are presented
in column 4-5. The estimated coefficients of the policy dummy is still not statistically dif-
ferent from zero in all cases, suggesting that easing the regulations on temporary contracts
does not affect at all the chances of getting a job in the undeclared sector.
We also inquired if the reform of apprenticeship contracts affected the hours worked by
the undeclared workers. We analyze such issue by estimating the following model:
log hi,r,t = c+ γ(DReform)r,t + φBi,r,t + ϕ(DReform)r,t ×Bi,r,t + βXi,r,t + δr + ζt + i,r,t (3)
where (DReform)r,t is our policy dummy, Bi,r,t is unity if the workers is undeclared and
Xi,r,t is a matrix of individual characteristics. The coefficient of interest in equation 3 is ϕ,
which measures the effect of the change in policy on the hours worked by informal workers.
The results are presented in Table 5. The models form column 1 to 7 are arranged as in table
4. The first row of table 5 shows the estimated coefficients, ϕ; it is statistically insignificant
in all cases but column 1, the baseline model, in which is positive and slightly significant.
Taken all together, these findings provide encouraging support to the idea that easing
restrictions on the use of temporary contracts does not have an impact in reducing the
undeclared work phenomenon.
4 A search and matching model
We model the labour market before the reforms, when only permanent contracts are available
and employers may hire workers in the formal or in the informal market. We compare it with
the labour market post-reforms, when short-term contracts represent an additional option
for the firms. Therefore, employers may decide to hire the workers in the formal market by
offering them either a permanent or a short-term contract, or in the informal market. One
of the innovative features of this approach is the fact that we are able to compare the market
before and after the reforms to analyze the impact of short-term contracts. Both models
are continuous time search and matching models a la Mortensen and Pissarides. We assume
that workers and firms meet in the labour market and from their match a positive surplus
is generated. Matches occur randomly and according to a matching function m(u, v) which
depends on the total number of unemployed individuals u and the total number of vacancies
v. The matching function is increasing in both arguments, concave and homogeneous of
degree one. When the firm opens a vacancy, it may meet an unemployed worker according
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to a Poisson process with arrival rate λ(θ)) = m(u, v)/v, where θ = u/v is defined as the
market tightness. The arrival rate of a job offer for unemployed workers is γ(θ) = m((u, v)/u.
Workers are ex ante homogeneous. When the match worker-firm is formed the productiv-
ity is revealed. The productivity of the worker has two components: a constant component
p, which is the same for all workers and a random component , which is specific to each
match and which is drawn from the random distribution G : [, ] → [0, 1]. Depending on
the productivity level the firm decides which contract to offer to the worker.
4.1 The model pre-reforms
Firms can decide to offer a formal (permanent) contract or an informal contract to the
unemployed worker they meet. The choice depends on the productivity level of the match.
If a formal contract is offered, the firm is required to pay payroll taxes, whose marginal rate
is τ , for the entire length of the contract and firing costs F , when the formal employment is
terminated. If an informal contract is offered, the firm is not subject to the payroll taxes,
however the firm might be caught by Government authorities according to a Poisson process
with arrival rate φ and might be forced to pay a penalty fee σ. In addition the employment
relationship is terminated. In this framework, we allow informal workers to search on the job
for better opportunities. Therefore according to a Poisson process with arrival rate χγ, the
informal worker may find a new job, terminate the ongoing working relationship and force
the firm to open a new vacancy.
After the match worker-firm is formed at arrival rate α a productivity shock may hit the
relationship and a new  is drawn from a sector specific distribution Hj : [, ]→ [0, 1], where
j = (F, I) (formal, informal). The new productivity levels are i.i.d. across workers and time.
The future of the worker-firm relationship depends on the new level of productivity of the
match: they might decide to change sector, keep the relationship unchanged or terminate it.
In order to understand the labour market dynamics, we will analyze in detail in the next
paragraph the firm’s and worker’s problems.
4.1.1 The firm’s problem
We define V as the value for a firm to open a vacancy and J j, j = (F, I) as the sector specific
value of having a filled position. The value for a firm to open a vacancy is equal to:
rV = −c+ λ
∫ 

max[JF (′I(′), V ]dG(′)− λV (4)
(5)
The firm has to pay a cost c for the time the vacancy being open. At rate λ the firm meets
an unemployed worker, the productivity level of the match is revealed and the firm decides
whether to offer a formal job, an informal job or to keep the vacancy. If the firm decides to
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hire the worker legally, the value function for the firm will be:
rJF () = p+ − (1 + τ)ωF () + αF
∫ F
F
max[JF (′I(′)− F, V − F ]dHF (′) (6)
− αFJF () (7)
(8)
The firm will receive a productivity flow equal to p+  and in exchange will pay the worker
a salary equal to ωF (). In addition, the firm will have to pay payroll taxes, whose marginal
rate is equal to τ . A rate αF a productivity shock may hit the match and a new productivity
level  is drawn from the distribution HF . Together, workers and firms will decide to keep
the relation formal, to turn into an informal one or to terminate the contract. In the latter
two cases, the firm is required to pay a firing cost F . In case the firm decides to offer an
informal contract while hiring a worker, the value function is:
rJ I() = p+ − ωI() + αI
∫ I
I
max[JF (′I(′), V ]dHI(′IJ I() (9)
+ φ(V − J I())− φσ + η(V − J I()) (10)
(11)
The firm still receives the productivity flow p +  and will pay to the worker the salary
ωI(), however the firm will not pay payroll taxes. At rate αI the match will be hit by a
productivity shock and as a result the relation may stay unchanged or may be turned into
a formal one or may be terminated, according to the new productivity level. In addition,
at rate φ Government authorities may discover the illegal activity of the firm, terminate the
relationship and charge the firm with a penalty fee equal to σ.
4.1.2 The worker’s problem
The value function for an unemployed worker is:
rU = b+ γ
∫ 

max[W F (′I(′), U ]dG(′)− γU (12)
(13)
The worker receives unemployment benefits b until he is unemployed. At rate γ the
worker meets a firm and the productivity level of the match is revealed. The worker may
receive a formal offer, an informal offer or no offer and continue to be unemployed. If he
receives an offer, this might be formal and informal and the corresponding value functions
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are:
rW F () = ωF () + αF
∫ F
F
max[W F (′I(′), U ]dHF (′) (14)
− αFW F () (15)
rW I() = ωI() + αI
∫ I
I
max[W F (′I(′), U ]dHI(′IW I() (16)
+ φ(U −W I()) + χγ
∫ 

max[W F (′I(′), U ]dG(′I() (17)
(18)
The formal worker receive a salary ωF () and at rate αF his employment relation may be
unchanged or may change by becoming informal or by being terminated, according to the
newly drawn productivity level. If the worker is offered an informal job, the worker receives
a salary ωI() and at rate αI , his productivity level will change. His employment relation
may become informal or terminate or may be unchanged. Moreover, at rate φ he may lose
his job because the illegal relation has been discovered by the authorities. Finally, informal
workers may also look for better jobs while working and find a new position at rate χγ.
Since the effort spent in looking for jobs while employed is lower than while unemployed,
the probability for employed people to find a job is lower compared to unemployed workers
and therefore χ < 1.
4.1.3 Surplus and wage bargaining
The surplus of the match changes according to the type of employment. If the signed contract
between firm and worker is formal, the firing cost which the firm has to pay at termination
enters in the surplus equation and affects the wage bargaining. Moreover the marginal payroll
tax rate is accounted for in the wage negotiations. The Nash bargaining mechanism is used
to compute the wage, where βj, j = (F, I) represents the bargaining power of the worker
respectively in the formal and informal sector. We believe that the bargaining power of the
worker in the informal sector is lower than in the formal sector. For simplicity reasons, we
assume that β
F
(1−βF )(1+τ) =
βI
(1−βI) , which satisfies the above mentioned belief that β
I < βF .
Workers and firms always agree on the decision to terminate the contract, thus there is no
room in this model for involuntary unemployment.
SF () = JF () +W F ()− (V − F )− U (19)
βF [JF ()− (V − F )] = (1− βF )(1 + τ)[W F ()− U ] (20)
SI() = J I() +W I()− V − U (21)
βI [J I()− V ] = (1− βI)[W I()− U ] (22)
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As a result of the Nash bargaining, according to the sector, the following wage equations
are derived:
ωF () =
βF
(1 + τ)
(p+ + cθ + rF ) + (1− βF )b (23)
ωI() = βI(p+ − φσ + (1− χ)cθ) + (1− βI)b (24)
4.1.4 Steady State
In order to compute the steady state of the model, we solve five equations in five unknowns.
We recognize four productivity thresholds and the market tightness as the parameters which
identify the equilibrium. The five equations summarize the job creation and job destruction
conditions as well as the free market condition V = 0.
When the firm hires an unemployed worker or an informal worker and the productivity
level is equal to R the firm is indifferent whether to offer a formal or an informal job.
JF (R) = J
I(R) (25)
This equation defines the flows of workers from unemployment to formal and informal
employment. When the firm transforms a formal job into an informal job the threshold
productivity level is equal to T . This threshold differs from the one described above, because
when transforming a formal job into an informal one the firm is subject to the payment of
a firing cost.
JF (T ) + F = J
I(T ) (26)
Therefore, this equation defines the flow of workers from to informal jobs. Finally, the
two job destruction conditions from a formal or an informal job are defined by:
JF (F ) + F = 0 (27)
J I(I) = 0 (28)
From equation 26 by plugging in the expression for the wage for formal workers ωF () as
in 55 we obtain:
JF () + F =
(1− βF )(− F )
r + αF
(29)
From equation 25 by plugging in the expression for the wage for formal workers ωI() as
in 56 we obtain:
J I() + F =
(1− βI)(− I)
r + φ+ η + αI
(30)
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The equilibrium of the model is therefore defined by the following set of equations:
1 + τ(1− βF )
(1 + τ)(1− βF )
[
(1− βF )(R − F )
r + αF
− F
]
=
(R − I)
r + φ+ η + αI
(31)[
(1 + τ(1− βF ))(T − F )
r + αF
]
=
(T − I)
r + φ+ η + αI
(32)
F = −rF − p+ (1 + τ)b+ β
F
(1− βF )cθ −
αF
[∫ T
HF
(1 + τ)
1 + τ(1− βF )
(′ − I)
(r + φ+ η + αI)
dHF (′) +
∫ HF
T
(′ − F )
(r + αF )
dHF (′)
]
(33)
I = −p+ b+ β
I
(1− βI)(1− χ)cθ + φσ −
αI
[∫ R
HI
(′ − I)
(r + φ+ η + αI)
dHI(′) +
∫ HI
R
1 + τ(1− βF )
(1 + τ)
[
(′ − F )
(r + αF )
− F
(1− βF )
]
dHI(′)
]
(34)
c
λ
=
∫ R
G
(1− βI)(′ − I)
(r + φ+ η + αI)
dG(′) +
∫ G
R
[
(1− βF )(′ − F )
(r + αF )
− F
]
dG(′)(35)
By analyzing the equations above we can claim that the equilibrium exist and is unique.
Higher θ increases the left hand side of Equation 67 and it lowers both formal and informal
surplus, by decreasing the right hand side of equation 67 as both thresholds F and I
depend positively on θ, while R does not affect the expected profit from opening a vacancy.
Therefore, there is a unique value of θ that satisfies the equation.
We can now retrieve the steady state value of unemployment and formal and informal
employment, by looking at the workers flows. Normalizing the labor force to unity, we get:
nI = 1− nF − u (36)
u =
αFHF (F )n
F + αIH
I(I)n
I + φnI
λ
(37)
nF =
[χγ(1−G(T )) + αI(1−HI(T ))]nI + γ(1−G(R))u
αFHF (F )
(38)
4.2 The model post-reforms
We now extend the previous model by including the possibility for the firm to hire workers
in the formal sector for a fixed period of time (temporary contracts). Temporary contracts
are designed to be more flexible, since at expiration the firm can let the worker go without
incurring in any firing cost. Moreover, generally, the marginal rate of the payroll tax as-
sociated with temporary contracts is lower compared to permanent contracts. In addition,
workers are willing to search for better jobs while employed, so the firm may incur the risk
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of losing the worker at rate ξγ. Compared to the previous set up, the firm’s and worker’s
problems get slightly more complicated.
4.2.1 The firm’s problem
Whenever a firm opens a vacancy it incurs in a cost c as long as the firm meets a worker at
rate λ. In this instant the productivity of the match is revealed and the two parities agree
on the future of the relationship. If the productivity is very high, the worker is offered a
permanent contract. If the productivity is very low, the firm keeps the vacancy opened. In
the intermediate situation, the worker may either get a temporary contract or may be hired
in the informal market.
rV = −c+ λ
∫ 

max[JP (′T (′I(′), V ]dG(′)− λV (39)
(40)
Once the worker is hired permanently, the firm receives a productivity flow equal to p+ and
pays to the worker a salary ωP () and to the Government the payroll tax equal to τPωP ().
At rate αP the match is hit by a productivity shock and the relation may change according
to the new drawn productivity level (Eq ??). If the worker is hired on a temporary basis,
the firm receives a productivity flow equal to p +  and pays to the worker a salary ωT ()
and to the Government the payroll tax equal to τTωT (), where τT < τP since the payroll
taxes associated with temporary contracts are lower compared to permanent contracts. At
rate αT the match is hit by a productivity shock and the relation may change according to
the new drawn productivity level. In addition at rate δ the worker may find a better job
and quit his current position, leaving the firm with an open vacancy (Eq ??). If the worker
is hired in the informal market, the firm receives a productivity flow equal to p+  and pays
to the worker a salary ωI(). However, the firm pays no payroll taxes to the Government.
At rate αI the match is hit by a productivity shock and the relation may change according
to the new drawn productivity level. In addition at rate φ the firm may be caught by the
Government authorities, subject to the payment of a penalty fee equal to φσ and forced to
open a new vacancy. Finally, at rate η the worker may find a better job and quit his current
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position, leaving the firm with an open vacancy (Eq 41).
rJP () = p+ − (1 + τP )ωP () (41)
+ αP
∫ P
P
max[JP (′T (′I(′)− F, V − F ]dHP (′PJP ()
rJT () = p+ − (1 + τT )ωT () (42)
+ αT
∫ T
T
max[JP (′T (′I(′)− F, V − F ]dHT (′TJT ()
+ δ(V − J I())
rJ I() = p+ − ωI() + αI
∫ I
I
max[JP (′T (′I(′), V ]dHI(′IJ I() (43)
+ φ(V − J I())− φσ + η(V − J I())
4.2.2 The worker’s problem
When the worker is unemployed he receives unemployment benefits b and meets a firm with
an open vacancy at rate γ. If he receives a permanent position, he will get a salary ωP ()
and at rate αP his productivity level may change as well as his employment status. He might
therefore become unemployed, transit to the informal sector or to a temporary position (Eq.
44).
rU = b+ γ
∫ 

max[W P (′T (′I(′), U ]dG(′)− γU (44)
rW P () = ωP () + αP
∫ P
P
max[W P (′T (′I(′), U ]dHP (′) (45)
− αPW P ()
If he is hired on a temporary basis (Eq. ??), he receives a salary ωT (), he may get hit
by a productivity shock at rate αT and at rate ξγ he may find a better job. Finally, if he
is hired in the informal sector he receives a salary equal to ωI() and he may be hit by a
productivity shock equal to αI . In addition at rate φ he will lose his job because of the
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Government authorities intervention. Finally at rate χγ he will find a better job (Eq. 46).
rW T () = ωT () + αT
∫ T
T
max[W P (′T (′I(′), U ]dHT (′) (46)
− αTW T () + ξγ
∫ 

max[W P (′T (′I(′), U ]dG(′)
− ξγW T ()
rW I() = ωI() + αI
∫ I
I
max[W P (′T (′I(′), U ]dHI(′IW I() (47)
+ φ(U −W I()) + χγ
∫ 

max[W P (′T (′I(′), U ]dG(′)
− χγW I()
4.2.3 Surplus and wage bargaining
The surplus of the match changes according to the sector as well as the type of contract.
Therefore, three types of surplus are computed: for permanent contracts, for temporary
contracts and for the informal sector. The firing cost F and the payroll taxes τ enter in the
bargaining equations and affect the equilibrium wages. To make the problem tractable we
assume that β
P
(1−βP )(1+τP ) =
βF
(1−βF )(1+τF ) =
βI
(1−βI) , thus the division of the surplus across jobs
is the same.
SP () = JP () +W P ()− (V − F )− U (48)
βP [JP ()− (V − F )] = (1− βP )(1 + τP )[W P ()− U ] (49)
ST () = JT () +W T ()− V − U (50)
βT [JT ()− V )] = (1− βT )(1 + τT )[W T ()− U ] (51)
SI() = J I() +W I()− V − U (52)
βI [J I()− V ] = (1− βI)[W I()− U ] (53)
As a result of the Nash bargaining, we can compute the equilibrium wages for the three
types of workers:
ωP () =
βP
(1 + τP )
(p+ + cθ + rF ) + (1− βP )b (54)
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ωT () =
βT
(1 + τT )
(p+ + (1− ξ)cθ) + (1− βT )b (55)
ωI() = βI(p+ − φσ + (1− χ)cθ) + (1− βI)b (56)
4.2.4 Steady State
The equilibrium steady state is defined by eight equations and eight unknown parameters.
The parameters which define the models include eight productivity thresholds and the market
tightness. The equations include the job destruction and job creation conditions and the free
entry condition V = 0.
The threshold G defines the level of productivity by which the firm is indifferent whether
to offer a permanent or a temporary job. Therefore it defines the job creation condition from
unemployment to formal employment (either permanent or temporary). The threshold D
defines the level of productivity by which the firm is indifferent whether to offer a temporary
job in the formal sector or a job in the informal sector. Therefore it defines the job creation
condition from unemployment to formal (temporary) and informal employment. Finally the
threshold B defines the level of productivity below which the firm is firing the worker and
opens a new vacancy. Therefore it defines the job destruction condition from temporary
employment to unemployment.
JT (G) = J
P (G) (57)
JT (D) = J
I(D) (58)
JT (B) = 0 (59)
The threshold A defines the level of productivity by which the firm is indifferent whether
to keep the worker as a permanent employee or offer him a temporary job. Therefore it defines
the job transition from permanent to temporary employment. The threshold S defines the
level of productivity by which the firm is indifferent whether to transfer the worker to a
temporary job in the formal sector or to a job in the informal sector. Therefore it defines
the job transition from permanent to formal (temporary) and informal employment. Finally
the threshold Q defines the level of productivity below which the firm is firing the worker
and opens a new vacancy. Therefore it defines the job destruction condition from permanent
employment to unemployment.
JP (A) + F = J
T (A) (60)
JP (S) + F = J
I(S) (61)
JP (Q) + F = 0 (62)
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The threshold V defines the level of productivity by which the firm is firing the informal
worker and opens a new vacancy. Therefore it defines the job destruction condition from
informal employment to unemployment.
J I(V ) = 0 (63)
From equation 60 by plugging in the expression for the wage for formal workers ωP () as
in 55
JP () + F =
(1− βP )(− Q)
r + αP
(64)
From equation 59 by plugging in the expression for the wage for formal workers ωT () as
in 56
JT () =
(1− βT )(− B)
r + δ + αT
(65)
From equation 59 by plugging in the expression for the wage for formal workers ωI() as
in 56
J I() =
(1− βI)(− V )
r + φ+ η + αI
(66)
The steady state equilibrium is therefore defined by the following set of equations:
(1 + τP )(1− βP ) + βP (1 + τT )
(1 + τP )(1− βP )
[
(1− βP )(G − Q)
r + αP
− F
]
=
(G − B)
r + δ + αT
(67)
1 + τT (1− βT )
(1 + τT )
(D − B)
r + δ + αT
=
(D − V )
r + φ+ η + αI
(68)
1 + τT (1− βT )
(1 + τT )(1− βT )
[
(1− βP )(N − Q)
r + αP
− F
]
=
(N − V )
r + φ+ η + αI
(69)
(1 + τP )(1− βP ) + βP (1 + τT )
(1 + τP )
[
(A − Q)
r + αP
]
=
(1− βT )(A − Q)
r + δ + αT
(70)
1 + τP (1− βP )
(1 + τP )
(S − Q)
r + αP
=
(S − V )
r + φ+ η + αI
(71)
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Q = −rF − p+ (1 + τP )b+ β
P
(1− βP )cθ − α
P
[∫ S
Q
(1 + τP )
1 + τP (1− βP )
(′ − R)
(r + φ+ η + αI)
]
dHP (′)
+αP
[∫ A
S
(′ − B)
(r + δ + αT )
dHT (′PA
(1 + τT )
(1 + τT )(1− βT ) + βT (1 + τP )
(′ − Q)
(r + αP )
dHP (′)
]
(72)
B = −p+ (1 + τT )b+ β
T
(1− βT )(1− ξ)cθ − α
T
[∫ D
T
(1 + τT )
1 + τT (1− βT )
(′ − V )
(r + φ+ η + αI)
]
dHP (′)
+αT
[∫ G
D
(1 + τP )
(1 + τP )(1− βP ) + βP (1 + τT )
(′ − B)
(r + δ + αT )
dHP (′PG
(′ − Q)
(r + αP )
dHP (′)
]
(73)
V = −p+ b+ β
I
(1− βI)(1− χ)cθ + φσ − α
I
[∫ D
V
(′ − V )
(r + φ+ η + αI)
dHI(′)
]
+
αI
(1− βIτT )
[∫ G
D
(′ − B)
(r + δ + αT )
dHI(′IG
[
(′ − Q)
(r + αP )
− F
]
dHI(′)
]
(74)
c
λ
=
∫ D

(1− βI)(′ − V )
(r + φ+ η + αI)
dG(′) +
∫ N
D
(1− βT )(′ − B)
(r + δ + αT )
dG(′N
[
(1− βP )(′ − Q)
(r + αP )
− F
]
dG(′)(75)
4.3 Discussion
TBD
4.4 Calibration and Policy Implication: How to drive emersion
5 Conclusions
We analized how different policy interventions can drive emersion from tax evasion.We have
studied in particular the emersion of undeclared labor and we have based our analysis on
the Italian labour market 1998-2003. Our empirical investigation suggests that 2003 Italian
labor market reform, despite aimed to create the necessary conditions to lead a reduction
of shadows activities, it wasn’t able to reach its objectives. We develop a searching and
matching model on the basis of our emprical results in order to determine the right mix of
policy interventions to obtain emersion. Our preliminary findings shows that differentiate
the forms of taxations and enforcement should work together to achieve emersion of tax
evasion.
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Table 1: Model parameters
Parameter Description
r Interest rate
βF Worker’s share of surplus in the formal sector
βI Worker’s share of surplus in the informal sector
 Lower bound of the G distribution
F Upper bound of the F distribution
F Upper bound of the H distribution
φ Rate at which the informal job is discovered
σ Penalty fee for irregular work
η Rate at which informal workers find a better job
αF Rate at which a productivity shock hits the match in the formal sector
αI Rate at which a productivity shock hits the match in the informal sector
b Unemployment benefits
p General productivity level
ξγ Rate at which an informal worker finds a job
γ Rate at which an unemployed worker finds a job
θ Market tightness
τ Payroll tax rate
pi Utility out of the labor force
nI Number of informal workers
nF Number of formal workers
u Number of formal workers
F Firing cost
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Table 2: Calibration exogenous parameter values
Parameter Pre-reforms Post-reforms
r 0.01 0.01
βF 0.54 0.54
βI 0.46 0.46
 2500 2500
G 1 1
HF 1 1
HI 1 1
τ 0.45 0.45
φ 0.05 0.05
c 0.01 0.01
ξ 0.4 0.4
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Table 3: The estimated impact of temporary jobs reform on the relative supply of undeclared
labor.
(1) (2) (3) 2000-08 2002-08
Reform 0.141 -0.0220 -0.0300 -0.118 -0.200
(0.316) (0.376) (0.349) (0.448) (0.500)
Construction -0.0126 -0.0116 0.0103 0.0173
(0.0351) (0.0351) (0.0450) (0.0542)
Retail Trade -0.0521∗∗ -0.0523∗∗ -0.0584∗ -0.0520
(0.0175) (0.0177) (0.0244) (0.0374)
Transport 0.125 0.123 0.0679 0.115
(0.0714) (0.0736) (0.0817) (0.0824)
Real Estate 0.0920∗ 0.0936∗ 0.0255 0.0218
(0.0383) (0.0375) (0.0520) (0.0555)
Age 0.313∗ 0.301 0.179 0.0853
(0.141) (0.144) (0.211) (0.267)
Primary Ed. -0.0115 -0.0118 -0.0132 -0.00719
(0.0168) (0.0171) (0.0280) (0.0296)
Secondary Ed. -0.00305 -0.00424 0.0127 0.00227
(0.0316) (0.0320) (0.0600) (0.0601)
Women -0.0443 -0.0440 -0.0653 -0.0717
(0.0241) (0.0234) (0.0341) (0.0364)
Work Experience -0.366∗ -0.353∗ -0.441∗ -0.392
(0.154) (0.163) (0.210) (0.221)
Time fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes
Unemp.rate - Temp.share no no yes no no
N 133 133 133 95 76
Roust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 4: The estimated impact of temporary jobs reform on the probability of being unde-
clared.
(1) (2) (3) Under 24 Under 30 Women 2000-2008
Reform 0.0000738 -0.00415 -0.00632 0.0419 0.00270 -0.00464 -0.00417
(0.00483) (0.00461) (0.00522) (0.0331) (0.0177) (0.00682) (0.00488)
Region fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Time fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Industry fixed effects no yes yes yes yes yes yes
Occupation dummies no yes yes yes yes yes yes
Region × linear trend no no yes no no no no
N 43384 42791 42791 3701 9741 17710 30611
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 5: The estimated impact of temporary jobs reform on hours worked.
(1) (2) (3) Under 24 Under 30 Women 2000-2008
Reform × Undeclared 1.605∗ 0.337 0.273 -0.248 0.479 0.301 0.874
(0.764) (0.705) (0.707) (1.260) (0.955) (1.139) (0.731)
Reform 3.047∗∗∗ -0.513∗∗ -0.321 0.159 -0.310 -0.810∗∗ -0.263
(0.200) (0.171) (0.184) (1.015) (0.464) (0.249) (0.180)
Undeclared -3.493∗∗∗ -0.505 -0.476 -0.623 -0.217 -0.339 -1.050∗∗
(0.339) (0.291) (0.291) (0.601) (0.405) (0.459) (0.358)
Region fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Time fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Industry fixed effects no yes yes yes yes yes yes
Occupation dummies no yes yes yes yes yes yes
Region × linear trend no no yes no no no no
N 43332 42749 42749 3695 9734 17698 30604
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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